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1 Introduction
We have proposed a specific non-Archimedean probability theory (henceforth
called NAP), which allows the assignment of non-zero probabilities to infi-
nitely unlikely events (Benci et al. [2013]). Examples of such events include the
random or biased selection of an element from the set of the natural numbers
or the integers, or from an interval of the rational or real numbers.1 Like
classical probability theory, NAP is applicable in a wide range of situations
and can be employed to model different sources of uncertainty. As such, NAP
is of relevance both to scholars who are interested in objective probability (or
‘chance’) and to those interested in subjective probability (and in particular in
the rational kind thereof, ‘credence’). Moreover, we think that NAP can be
useful in the context of physics, where similar methods have found applica-
tions already (see Albeverio et al. [1986] and references in Cutland [1983]).
NAP is motivated by four desiderata for a theory of probability: regularity,
totality, perfect additivity, and weak Laplacianism. First, ‘regularity’ is the
constraint that the probability of a possible event (that is, a non-empty subset
of the sample space) should be strictly larger than that of the impossible event
(that is, the empty set). It is a special case of the Euclidean principle, which
requires that any set should be given a strictly larger probability than each of
its strict subsets.2 More generally, we want our probability function to be
maximally sensitive to differences in this partial order (inclusion) between
events. Second, ‘totality’ is the desideratum that all subsets of the sample
space must be assigned a probability value. In other words, all sets should
be measurable. Third, ‘perfect additivity’ is the requirement that the probabil-
ity of an arbitrary union of mutually disjoint events is equal to the sum of the
1 Outside the context of this article, it may be better to refer to our theory as NAP–BHW, to
distinguish it from related theories. Similar approaches have recently been developed by
Hammond ([1994]), Pivato ([2014]), and Pedersen ([unpublished]). (For more on related
work, see Pivato [2014], p. 55ff.)
2 Regularity as a norm for probability theory and the use of infinitesimals to attain this norm have
been discussed both in the context of objective probability (see, for example, Hofweber [2014]
and references therein) and in the context of subjective probability (see, for example, Pedersen
[2014] and references therein). See also the references in (Ha´jek [unpublished]).
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probabilities of the separate events, where ‘sum’ has to be defined in an appro-
priate way in the infinite case.3 Fourth, ‘weak Laplacianism’ is the require-
ment that a probability theory should allow for a uniform probability
distribution on sample spaces of any cardinality as well as many other prob-
ability ratios between the atomic events. That is, the theory should allow for a
mathematical representation of any probabilistic situation that is conceptually
possible (from a pretheoretic standpoint).
Non-Archimedean probability theories have been developed that are unob-
jectionable from a mathematical point of view. But in recent years, philoso-
phical arguments have been developed by Williamson ([2007]) Easwaran
([2014]), and others that purport to show on conceptual grounds that an
appeal to infinitesimal probability values is inherently problematic. The
main purpose of the present article is to defend non-standard probability
against these critiques. We shall argue that the mathematical details of the
non-Archimedean probability theory matter in this discussion. In particular,
we will show how NAP can provide a diagnosis of where the objections
against appealing to infinitesimals in probability theory go wrong.
The structure of this article is as follows: First, we describe the limitations of
the orthodox approach to probability theory (Section 2). Subsequently, we
describe one particular theory of non-standard probability, called NAP
(Section 3), which satisfies the four desiderata listed above. Then we discuss
various objections against the use of infinitesimals in probability theory and we
evaluate them in the context of NAP (Section 4). We show that the arguments
against infinitesimal probability values do not establish what they seek to estab-
lish and we argue that the proposed account cannot be dismissed on the basis of
the arguments that have been adduced in the literature. We then expand on the
virtues of infinitesimal probabilities.We explain howNAP provides satisfactory
models for the probabilistic scenarios that classical probability theory cannot
adequately describe; we show how NAP yields total, regular, and perfectly
additive probability functions even for uncountable domains, and we indicate
the role that NAP can play in decision theory (Section 5). In the concluding
section, we discuss some more general underlying concerns and evaluate the
viability of NAP in light of its advantages and its drawbacks (Section 6). In the
Appendix, more details are given about the construction of NAP models.
2 The Limits of Classical Probability Theory
The axioms of Kolmogorov constitute the basis of the received view of prob-
ability theory.
3 The requirement for perfect additivity is closely related to that of regularity and totality. Skyrms
([1983]) called it ‘ultra-additivity’ and analysed it as a Zenonian intuition.
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2.1 Classical probability functions
The set of atomic outcomes, , is called the ‘sample space’; the -algebra on
, A, is called the ‘event space’. The following set of axioms is equivalent to
those presented by Kolmogorov ([1956]):
K0. Domain and Range: The events are the elements of a -algebra
A  P ð Þ and the probability function is a function
PK : A!R:
K1. Non-negativity: 8A 2 A;
PKðAÞ  0:
K2. Normalization:
PKðÞ ¼ 1:
K3. Additivity: If A and B are events and A \ B ¼ ;; then
PKðA [ BÞ ¼ PKðAÞ þ PKðBÞ:
K4. Continuity: Let
A ¼
[
n2N
An;
where An  Anþ1 are elements of A; then
PKðAÞ ¼ lim
n!1PKðAnÞ: ð1Þ
Adding this last axiom to the previous ones is equivalent to requiring ‘coun-
table additivity’ or ‘-additivity’.
The triple h;A;PKi is called a ‘classical’ probability space. Classical prob-
ability theory is mathematically coherent and useful. The existence of models
for the axioms proves its consistency and the wide range of applications by
physicists, engineers, and economists shows its usefulness in modelling situa-
tions in the physical world. Nonetheless, there are probabilistic scenarios
involving infinite sample spaces that cannot be described in a satisfactory
manner in terms of probability functions that are governed by
Kolmogorov’s axioms.
2.2 Limitations
The axioms of Kolmogorov lead to a probability theory that does not respect
any of the four principles mentioned in the introduction. By considering
uncountable sample spaces, it is clear that the classical approach does not
guarantee regularity, totality, or perfect additivity (see, for example, Skyrms
[1983]). Moreover, the orthodox theory violates weak Laplacianism, since it
does not allow us to represent uniform probability distributions on countable
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sample spaces. Consider the fair lottery on N ¼ f1; 2; 3; . . .g, which is some-
times called the ‘de Finetti lottery’ (also discussed in Wenmackers and
Horsten [2013]). It is easy to see that there is no coherent way to describe it
in terms of classical probability functions. Because of the Archimedean prop-
erty of the real numbers (that are used in the value range of classical prob-
ability functions) and finite additivity, the probability of any particular ticket
winning has to be set to zero.4 This entails that either the normalization axiom
or the continuity axiom has to be abandoned. The first option relates to
proposals for unbounded probability (such as that of Re´nyi [1955]). With
NAP, however, we opt for the second option.
In the context of a subjective interpretation of probability, de Finetti
([1974]) advocated merely finite additivity. Whereas de Finetti did not require
that probabilities be assigned to all events of a -algebra A, which is part of
K0, we also introduce the notion of ‘semi-classical’ probability functions that
satisfy K0–K3, and are thus only ‘finitely additive’. This is sufficient to satisfy
weak Laplacianism at least to a minimal extent: the uniform zero distribution
is now consistent with the axioms. However, probability theory lacks mathe-
matical power if it cannot make use of limit behaviour for calculating prob-
abilities.5 In NAP, countable additivity is replaced by an axiom that is
compatible with a stronger form of additivity (perfect additivity)
and that does provide an alternative sense of limit operations (as explained
further on).
There is a second aspect of a semi-classical description of the fair lottery on
N that is unattractive: by assigning probability zero to each natural number,
the semi-classical probability values collapse a distinction between any infi-
nitely improbable but possible event (‘remote contingency’) on the one hand,
and the impossible event (empty set) on the other hand. Of course, the same
violation of regularity occurs for classical probability functions—whether fair
or not—on uncountable domains, where they too have to assign probability
zero to many contingent events.
The assignment of probability zero to remote contingencies creates pro-
blems for formally modelling conditionals,6 utilities, and learning situations.
The following observations are phrased in terms of fair infinite lotteries, but
they apply to all situations that use (semi-)classical probability functions to
model (countably) infinite event spaces.
4 The Archimedean property of R says that given any strictly positive real number, r, and a larger
real number, R, there exists a natural number, N, such that the product N r exceeds R; in other
words, R does not contain infinitesimals.
5 In practice, statisticians do not run into problems with the failure of weak Laplacianism, since
they have accustomed themselves to working on continuum-sized spaces, where -additivity is
compatible with uniform distributions provided that all point events are given probability zero.
6 In particular, when one uses Adams’s thesis (see, for example, Arlo-Costa [2008]).
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First, the (semi-)classical approach with the ratio formula alone does not
give a satisfactory account of conditional probabilities. We are strongly
inclined to think that in the fair lottery on N or on R; the probability that
ticket number 1 wins given that one ticket of the set f1; 2; 3g wins, is 1
3
(see, for
example, Bartha and Hitchcock [1999], p. 407). According to the way of
defining conditional probability via a ratio, however, this conditional prob-
ability is undefined since it involves putting the probability of the conditioning
event—zero in this case—in the denominator. In the context of uncountable
sample spaces, it is well known that classical probability functions do not
contain enough information to compute all conditional probabilities and
the limiting operation must be specified separately.7
Second, the (semi-)classical approach leads to problems for decision theory.
If the probability of a single ticket winning is zero, then given the standard
mechanism for calculating expected utilities, participation in the fair lottery on
N could not have non-zero expected utility for an agent, even if the prize for
winning is very high. So, an agent should be indifferent between owning a
single (or any finite set of) ticket(s) and owning none at all. For a fair infinite
lottery on R, the agent should be indifferent between owning the set of all
rational number tickets and owning none at all. This seems incorrect.
Third, the (semi-)classical approach does not accommodate the possibility
of learning from remote evidence. Suppose that an agent does participate in a
fair lottery on an infinite sample space. Suppose that her credences are regu-
lated by a (semi-)classical probability function, as they should be according to
Bayesian accounts of subjective probability. Suppose further that our agent
happens to have drawn the winning ticket. Then she will want to update her
credences on the evidence that she has received, but she cannot update in the
normal, Bayesian manner a probability that started out as zero to any other
value. An important instance of this problem: if the probability of history
going as it actually goes is zero (according to some system of laws), one
cannot update on the present state (within this system).
2.3 Infinitesimals to the rescue?
The three problems discussed in the previous section can be avoided if the
probability functions are regular.8 The most straightforward suggestion to
obtain regular probability functions is to make room for attributing
7 When taking the limit of conditional probabilities to an empty conditioning event, this results in
puzzles like the Borel–Kolmogorov paradox (Kolmogorov [1956], pp. 50–1). Concerning such
cases, Jaynes ([2003], Section 15.7) has written: ‘In general, the final result will and must depend
on which limiting operation was specified’.
8 We are not suggesting that this is the only viable option to address these problems; in Section
5.4, we briefly discuss the relation between our approach and approaches that are based on
conditional probability functions or lexicographical probabilities.
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infinitesimally small but non-zero probability values to events. In the fair
lottery on N, for instance, it seems reasonable to judge the probability that
a given ticket wins to be infinitesimally small, but non-zero. This suggestion
was pursued by several authors on several occasions (see Footnote 2).
Regularity can be introduced in the axioms by strengthening K1, but it
also requires modifying principles K0 and K4. Regarding K0, the value
range of generalized probability functions must be extended. One require-
ment is that we should be able to calculate with the generalized probability
values much as we are able to calculate with classical probability values. In
particular, there must be a natural way of adding and multiplying them (to
allow computation of probabilities of unions and intersections of events).
Fortunately, since the work of Robinson ([1961]), we know a precise sense in
which systems of real numbers that include infinitesimals can be taken to
form a field.
Nonetheless, the question remains of how non-standard probability values
should be attached to events of a sample space. Ideally, we want to be able to
do this in such a way that perfect additivity is also satisfied, by replacing K4
with a different infinite additivity axiom. Applied to the fair lottery on N,
there is a very simple (and, as we will see very shortly, na€ıve) proposal how this
can be done. The ‘measure’ of the ordered set of the natural numbers N, one
might say, is !: the smallest infinite ordinal number. Therefore, ‘1!’ might be
thought of as an infinitesimally small number, which seems a good candidate
for assigning to any point event as a probability value after normalization.9
After all, this appears to yield a very natural countable additivity property:
!  ð1!Þ ¼ 1:10
Unfortunately, this idea does not work. We want our generalized probabil-
ity function to be maximally sensitive to distinctions in sizes of events. We
want P to be such that
Pðf;gÞ5Pðf1gÞ5Pðf1; 2gÞ5Pðf1; 2; 3gÞ5 . . .
This means that we must exhaust all the finite numbers to measure the finite
sets. But then the set f2; 3; 6; . . .g of even numbers, for instance, must surely
already be assigned an infinite measure before normalization. And therefore
the measure of the ordered set N (which must be strictly larger than that of the
set of the even numbers) must be much larger than the first infinite ordinal !.
More generally, we would like the generalized probability function to
satisfy the ‘Euclidean principle’: For all events A and B, if A is a proper
9 We have put it between quotation marks, since the reciprocal of an ordinal number is undefined.
10 These considerations may provide motivation to explore the use of Conway’s surreal numbers as
probability values. We are grateful to Kenny Easwaran for this observation; see also his
(Easwaran [2014], p. 38).
Infinitesimal Probabilities 7
 by guest on A
ugust 16, 2016
http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
sub-event of B, then PðAÞ5PðBÞ (see Section 3.6; Benci et al. [2006]; Parker
[2013]). This desideratum, which is equivalent to the aforementioned regular-
ity demand, makes it a not altogether trivial task to describe even the fair
lottery on N in terms of infinitesimals.
Consistent theories of probability functions that draw on ideas from non-
standard analysis (NSA) have been proposed in the literature. A classification
of them is given in Table 1. Two well-known examples are the theory of Loeb
measures ([1975]) and Nelson’s ([1987]) ‘radically elementary probability
theory’. However, Loeb’s and Nelson’s theories describe lotteries on non-
standard domains, so they simply do not address the problem of describing
the fair lottery on N (or its natural generalizations to Q; 2N ,. . .). The task
before us is to describe fair lotteries on such standard domains. Loeb’s theory
has a standard co-domain (R), whereas in Nelson’s theory, the co-domain is
also non-standard.
It is not difficult to construct non-standard probability models that are the
exact analogues of semi-classical models, namely, models with a standard
sample space that assign non-standard real numbers to events and that in
addition satisfy Kolmogorov’s axioms except -additivity (and K0, of
course). One can even force such models to be regular (McGee [1994]).
However, it is not straightforward to construct a class of such models that
in addition have plausible infinite additivity properties. This requires a new
concept of a ‘limit of probabilities’, which was developed in (Benci et al.
[2013]). The resulting theory, NAP, will be described in Section 3 below;
NAP occupies the fourth quadrant in Table 1.11
Note that we have not started out from a non-standard measure theory that
we then applied to the concept of probability. Instead, we started from four
intuitive requirements about probability. The model for this happens to
require a fine free ultrafilter (or equivalently, a maximal ideal), just like
NSA does, but this does not reduce NAP to NSA—nor vice versa: NSA
and NAP have different motivations and interpretations, which turn out to
be related to the same underlying mathematical structure.
Table 1. Quantitative probability theories
Domain:
Standard Non-standard
Range: R Kolmogorov Loeb
Non-Archimedean field NAP Nelson
11 Pivato ([2014]) develops an approach that should also be situated in this quadrant.
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3 NAP Theory
In this section, we describe NAP in an axiomatic way so that it can be com-
pared directly with Kolmogorov’s axioms. We start with the first four axioms
of NAP. Then we discuss the last axiom, which is the most delicate one.
3.1 First four axioms of NAP
The first four axioms of NAP are the following:
NAP0. Domain and Range: The events are all the subsets of, which is
a finite or infinite sample space. Probability is a total function
P : P ð Þ!R;
where P() is the powerset (set of all subsets) of  and R is a
superreal field (that is, an ordered field that contains the real
numbers as a subfield).
NAP1. Regularity: Pð;Þ ¼ 0 and 8A 2 P ð Þn ;f g;
PðAÞ > 0: ð2Þ
NAP2. Normalization:
PðÞ ¼ 1: ð3Þ
NAP3. Additivity: If A and B are events and A \ B ¼ ;; then
PðA [ BÞ ¼ PðAÞ þ PðBÞ:
Observe that in the axioms NAP0–NAP3, the fieldR is not specified.12,13 It
is important to notice that NAP uses the domain to build the range. For
example, consider the case with  ¼ a; bf g; Pð af gÞ ¼ 1= ﬃﬃﬃ2p , and hence Pð bf gÞ
¼ 1 1= ﬃﬃﬃ2p : In this case the natural field is Q ﬃﬃﬃ2p : However, as long as there
is no need to introduce infinitesimal probabilities, all these fields are contained
in R and hence it is simpler to take 0; 1½ R as the range.
Immediate consequences of the axioms are14:
Proposition 1
If NAP0, NAP1, NAP2, and NAP3 hold, then:
(1) 8A 2 PðÞ; PðAÞ 2 0; 1½ R
(2) PðAÞ ¼ 1, A ¼ 
12 If we would specify some range upfront, even if it would be a non-Archimedean set, we would
not be able to guarantee regularity. This can be seen from a cardinality argument introduced by
Ha´jek ([unpublished]) and formalized by Pruss ([2013]): these impossibility results assume a
fixed range and hence do not apply to NAP.
13 This need not be surprising: in finite probability theory, the same happens. In many games, such
as games involving fair dice, we have R ¼ Q, but it is possible to have less familiar fields.
14 For a proof of this (elementary) proposition, see (Benci et al. [2013]).
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(3) Moreover, assume that one of the following holds:
  is countable and the theory is fair, namely, 8!;  2 ;
P !f gð Þ ¼ P f gð Þ
  is uncountable
then R is a non-Archimedean field.
This proposition demonstrates that non-Archimedean fields arise quite natu-
rally from axiom NAP1.
3.2 Continuity and conditional probability
We have noted that a retreat to finite additivity is unsatisfactory because it does
not allow the calculation of infinitely disjunctive events on the basis of limit
behaviour. For the same reason the probability theory consisting solely of
NAP0–NAP3 is too weak. We need to add an axiom that replaces axiom K4
of classical probability theory and that allows some kind of infinite sum. The
trouble with this point, however, lies with the limit operation. In fact, if we want
to take the limit of a sequence of points an 2 X , it seems desirable for X to be
complete since otherwise the Cauchy sequences might not be convergent and
this fact prevents the development of any interesting calculus. In probability
theory, X needs to be an ordered field as well. But the only complete ordered
field is R; no non-Archimedean field is complete. This is the main technical
problem in dealing with non-Archimedean fields. We proposed to solve this
problem by constructing a different notion of limit, which we here call the ‘-
limit’. (In Benci et al. [2013] this limit was called the ‘-limit’.)
In order to present the-limit in a natural way, we will introduce the following
principle, which states that fixing the conditional probability, PðAjlnÞ, for a
sufficiently large family of finite sets, ln, determines the value of PðAjÞ, which
is nothing but the unconditional probabilityP(A). The same idea is also present in
Kolmogorov’s classical setting, only the details of the limit operation are different:
Conditional Probability Principle (CPP): Let flng be a family of events such
that ln  lnþ1 and  ¼
[
n2N
ln; then, eventually
PK lnð Þ > 0;
and, for any event, A, we have that
PKðAÞ ¼ lim
n!1 PKðAjlnÞ:
It is easy to prove that CPP is equivalent to K4 (Benci et al. [2013]); the
advantage of CPP is that it is easier to reformulate it in an NAP context.
More precisely: we shall give an appropriate notion of limit that allows us to
formulate a variant of CPP within NAP, and this will be the final axiom of NAP.
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3.3 The final axiom of NAP Theory
It is possible to associate a hyperreal number with any real-valued function
that is defined only on the finite subsets of the sample space, such that certain
natural algebraic properties hold among these numbers. The details are given
in the Appendix. We call this operation the ‘-limit’ (denoted as liml") and
one may interpret the resulting hyperreal number as the function’s ‘value at
infinity’ (though it is not to be confused with the usual Archimedean limit,
denoted as limn!1). With the help of this non-Archimedean limit operation,
we can now formulate the CPP in NAP, which in some sense replaces axiom
K4 of classical probability theory. Please note that PfinðAÞ denotes the collec-
tion of finite subsets of a set A. This axiom is the keystone of NAP.
NAP4. CPP in NAP: For any A 2 P ð Þ and any l 2 Pfin ð Þ;
P Ajlð Þ 2 R ð4Þ
and
PðAÞ ¼ lim
l"
PðAjlÞ: ð5Þ
This limit can be rigorously defined and shown to exist (see Appendix), and
the functions resulting from NAP0–NAP4 can be shown to satisfy the four
desiderata for probability functions that were discussed in the introduction.
The intuitive meaning of Equation (5) is obvious: the probability of an event
A is the -limit of the conditional probability P Ajlð Þ obtained by a finite
sample set l. We can give a suggestive interpretation to Equations (4) and
(5) as follows: We may think of the real number PðAjlÞ as the result of
experiments. The probability, P(A), of event A is the ‘abstract’ extrapolation
from the results of all possible finite experiments.
Formally, CPP and NAP4 are similar, and they are also similar in inter-
pretation. But from a technical point of view, they are quite different. For
example, since l is a finite set, usually in classical theory PK ðlÞ ¼ 0 and hence
PK Ajlð Þ cannot be defined. In NAP, in contrast, PðAjlÞ plays a central role.15
3.4 Infinite sums
The Weierstrass notion of the classical limit is assumed in the rigorous defini-
tion of the sum of an infinite sequence. Analogously, the -limit allows us to
define the sum of infinitely many real numbers. In this section, we will inves-
tigate this operation and, in the next section, it will be applied to NAP.
15 By CPP, PK jlð Þ is used to define PK ðÞ, but PK jlð Þ cannot always be retrieved from the infor-
mation encoded in PK ð. . .Þ. In NAP, PðjlÞ is important both in the construction of PðÞ and it
can be retrieved from it by the usual ratio formula.
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Let x! be a family of real numbers indexed by ! 2 E  . The -sum of all
x!s is defined as follows:
X
!2E
x! ¼ lim
l"
X
!2E\l
x!: ð6Þ
Notice that, since l is always finite, the function
’ðlÞ :¼
X
!2E\l
x!
of l is well defined, always yielding a real number as function value.
The main differences between our new type of infinite sum and the classical
series are:
. As shown in the Appendix, the -sum depends on the choice of a free
ultrafilter, U. This is not the case with the usual series. So it would
actually be more appropriate to write
P
!2E;U x! rather than
P
!2E x!:
. TheWeierstrass-sum of a series exists only for certain countable sets of real
numbers, while the -sum exists for every family of real numbers indexed
by ! 2 E  . In principle,  and hence E may have any cardinality.
. The Weierstrass-sum of a sequence—if it exists—is a real number, while
the result of an -sum is a hyperreal number in R.
3.5 Definition of NAP functions via infinite sums
One of the main consequences of axiom K4 is -additivity, which defines
infinite sums and relates them to probabilities of unions of countably many
events. In this section, we will see that its non-Archimedean counterpart,
axiom NAP4, also allows us to relate the infinite sums defined in the previous
section to (generalized) probability functions and to generalize well-known
properties used in finite probability theory.
Weight Function:
w : !R:
A weight function describes the relative probability of elementary events.
Notice that two different weight functions that are proportional to each
other are equivalent for all practical purposes.
The following can be shown (Benci et al. [2013]):
Proposition 2
The function w takes its values in R and for any finite l, the following holds:
PðAjlÞ ¼
P
!2A\l w !ð ÞP
!2l w !ð Þ
: ð7Þ
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Taking the -limit of both sides of Equation (7), we get
PðAÞ ¼
P
!2A w !ð ÞP
!2 w !ð Þ
: ð8Þ
More generally, we have for any A;B 2 PðÞ;
PðAjBÞ ¼
P
!2A\B w !ð ÞP
!2B w !ð Þ
: ð9Þ
These properties generalize well-known properties that hold when  is a
finite probability space. But these formulas say more: they say that in order to
know the probability of any event, A; it is sufficient to know the relative
probability, wð!Þ, of each elementary event, !, and the rule that allows us
to take an infinite sum, that is, the rule that allows us to take the -limit
(which is defined by Equation (A.2) via a free ultrafilter, U; see
Appendix). Since Equation (8) holds for arbitrary w, weak Laplacianism is
fulfilled.
The main result, that NAP functions on infinite sample spaces exist, was
shown in (Benci et al. [2013]), but it can be seen from combining the proof in
the Appendix concerning -limits, the definition in Equation (5), and
Proposition 2.
So the NAP space is a triple h;w;UPfinðÞi where:
.  is the sample space;
. w : !Rþ is a weight function;
. UPfinðÞ is a free ultrafilter on PfinðÞ:
Regularity is imposed by requiring the ultrafilter to be ‘fine’ (see Kanamori
[1994], p. 301).
3.6 Relation to numerosity theory
NAP is related to the theory of numerosity introduced in (Benci [1995]) and
developed in various directions (Gilbert and Rouche [1996]; Benci and Di
Nasso [2003]; Benci et al. [2006]). We briefly sketch the main tenets of this
theory.
In order to count the elements of a set, A, it is necessary to have a set of
numbers, N, and a rule, s, that specifies the number of elements, sðAÞ 2 N,
that belong to set A. More precisely, we can say that the operation of counting
consists of a triple ðU;N;sÞ, where U is the family of sets that can be counted,
N is the set of numbers, and s : U!N is a function. In the following, we shall
call a triple, ðU;N;sÞ, that satisfies the basic properties related to our intuition
of counting a ‘counting system’. We highlight the following two principles
governing counting systems, which are important for the basic view:
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Euclidean Principle (EP): If AˆB, then sðAÞ'sðBÞ
Humean Principle (HP): If the elements of A can be put in a one-to-one
correspondence with the elements of B, then sðAÞ ¼ sðBÞ:
If we take U ¼ Fin (the class of finite sets), N ¼ N (the set of natural
numbers), and s ¼ j  j (the usual function that gives the number of elements
of a finite set), then we obtain the ‘natural numbers counting theory’
ðFin;N; j  jÞ: Of course, it satisfies all the intuitive properties of counting
plus EP and HP, since those properties are extracted from intuitions that
are largely based on dealing with finite sets and natural numbers. If infinite
sets with strict subsets of the same cardinality are included in U, then it is well
known that the properties EP and HP are inconsistent with each other.
However, then there remain consistent counting theories that are based on
either EP or HP.
Cantor was the first to realize this. He abandoned EP and constructed on
the basis of HP the theory of cardinal numbers ðS;Card; j  jÞ, where S is the
class of all sets and Card denotes the class of cardinal numbers.
Cantor also understood that if you count an infinite set, the result (that is,
the type of number) obtained depends on the method that you employ for
counting. In fact, he generalized the operation of counting in two different
ways and he obtained not only the theory of cardinal numbers ðS;Card; j  jÞ
but also the theory of ordinal numbers ðWO;Ord; ordÞ; here WO denotes the
class of well-ordered sets, Ord the class of ordinal numbers, and ord the order
type of a well-ordered set.16 The two counting systems give different results
when applied to infinite sets. Also, it is well known that the arithmetic in Card
and Ord does not satisfy the usual algebraic rules that we are used to based on
our experience with natural numbers. For instance, reciprocals are not defined
for either (cf. Section 2.3).
Now, the following question arises naturally: ‘Is there a different way to
count the elements of infinite sets satisfying EP and such that the operations
‘+’ and ‘’ satisfy the usual algebraic properties?’
The answer is yes, and we will see that the notion of -limit can be used to
construct such a counting system. A counting system ðU; N; nÞwhich satisfies
EP will be called a ‘numerosity theory’: n will be called the numerosity func-
tion and nðEÞ is the numerosity of the set E.
The numerosity theory relevant for this article is given by ðPðÞ; N0; nÞ
where for every A 2 PðÞ; n is given by
nðAÞ ¼ lim
l"
jA \ lj;
16 For an account of the history of the measurement of sets of infinite size, see (Mancosu [2009]).
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where l ranges over finite subsets of  and N0 is a non-standard model of the
natural numbers. In a numerosity theory, the numerosity ofN is denoted by .17
Given the following definition, numerosity theory can be related to NAP in
the case of fair lotteries:
Definition 3: If 8!1; !2 2 ; wð!1Þ ¼ wð!2Þ; then the probability function
ð;PÞ is called fair.
Without loss of generality, we can set wð!Þ ¼ 1 for every ! 2  in the fair case.
Hence, if ð;PÞ is a fair lottery:
P Að Þ ¼
P
!2A w !ð ÞP
!2 w !ð Þ
¼
lim
l"
P
!2A\l w !ð Þ
lim
l"
P
!2l w !ð Þ
¼
lim
l"
jA \ lj
lim
l"
jlj ¼
nðAÞ
nðÞ :
This formula is an expression of Laplace’s famous ‘First principle’ ([1902],
pp. 6, 9): the probability, P(A), of an event, A, is the ratio between the number
nðAÞ of favourable cases and the number of all cases, nðÞ, provided that they
are equiprobable.18
Consider again the infinite set N ¼ f1; 2; 3; . . .g. Now consider the set
S ¼ f2; 3; . . .g. We may describe this set relative to N in two ways, which
may promote different intuitions about its relative size (cf. Section 4.2):
. If we describe S as fnjn 2 N ^ n 6¼ 1g ¼ Nnf1g, then we emphasize that S
is a strict subset of N, which suggests that S has a smaller size than N
(following the Euclidean principle of size).
. If we describe S as fn þ 1jn 2 Ng ¼ N þ 1, then we convey that S can be
obtained via a re-labelling or translation of the elements of N, which
suggests that S has the same size as N (following the Humean principle
of size).
Although the expression ‘Nnf1g’ refers to the same set S as the expression
‘N þ 1’, the corresponding intuitions about the size of S relative to N cannot
hold simultaneously: two sizes cannot both be different and the same. This is a
simple illustration of the incompatibility of EP and HP.
The theory of cardinal numbers adopts HP as a criterion of identity. But
probability theory cannot accept HP as a criterion of identity. Probability
functions should not assign equal probability to all equinumerous sets of
the sample space; otherwise it would lead to absurd conclusions, such as
17  can be related to @0 or to !, but it should not be confused with either. Their relation is quite
involved and we refer interested readers to (Benci et al. [2006]), where this question has been
analysed.
18 For definiteness, the reader may consider a fair lottery on N; see (Wenmackers and Horsten [2013],
Section 6.2; Benci et al. [2013], Section 5.2). In particular, it is possible to assign probabilities that are
equal to 1=n for each of the sets nN þ i for any natural number, n, and i 2 f0; . . . ; ng. This case has
been discussed in terms of numerosities in (Mancosu [2009], Section 6.2).
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½0; 1
2
 always being equiprobable to ½0; 1. But even though HP has to be aban-
doned, there is the possibility of adopting EP, which entails regularity in the
context of probabilities. At least in infinite lottery situations, EP has a strong
intuitive pull.19 And we have seen that NAP constructs probability functions
on infinite sample spaces that satisfy EP.
4 Objections and Replies
Various authors have formulated objections against the use of infinitesimal
probability values. Some of these objections are presented as general argu-
ments, not aimed against a particular theory, but rather against any hypothe-
tical theory that involves non–Archimedean probability values. If any of these
arguments are accepted as decisive, then any attempt to work out the details of
such a theory is nipped in the bud. NAP shows that it is possible to develop a
consistent non-Archimedean theory of probability meeting key conceptual
desiderata. We now evaluate the general objections to infinitesimal probabil-
ities in the light of NAP. It will turn out that the arguments against infinite-
simal probabilities crucially depend on certain assumptions regarding the
properties of probability functions that are taken to be uncontroversial by
their authors, but which do require careful scrutiny.20
4.1 Cantor and the Archimedean property
We start off with a historically important argument against infinitesimal num-
bers in general that was formulated by Cantor ([1966], pp. 407–9). His argu-
ment is very cryptic: he merely states that not even a transfinite sum of
infinitesimals can exceed a non-infinitesimal bound. What is behind this asser-
tion can plausibly be spelled out as follows.
Consider the fair lottery on N again. Let us entertain the supposition
that equal infinitesimal probability  is assigned to each point event. Define
Probðf1; 2gÞ ¼ Probðf1gÞ þ Probðf2gÞ;
Probðf1; 2; 3gÞ ¼ Probðf1gÞ þ Probðf2gÞ þ Probðf3gÞ; . . .
Then consider the following !-sequence:
Probðf1gÞ;Probðf1; 2gÞ;Probðf1; 2; 3gÞ; . . .
19 For a vivid description of the intuitive pull of EP in infinite lottery situations, see (McCall and
Armstrong [1989]).
20 In this section, we use the notation ‘Prob’ for probability functions in arguments that do not
specify the formalism to which the function belongs. In cases where the formalism is clear, we
stick to the notations PK and P for Kolmogorovian and NAP functions, respectively.
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This sequence is bounded (by 1), so there must be a least upper bound, which
we may call !  . But it is easy to see that between !    and !   at most
one n   (with n 2 N) can lie. After all, for any n 2 N that lies in this open
interval, we must then have:
ðn  1Þ  5 ð!  Þ  5 n  5!  5 ðn þ 1Þ  :
This must mean that !   does not exceed an infinitesimal value. This
argument carries over to all limit ordinals, and the conclusion then is that
l   does not exceed an infinitesimal value for any transfinite number l. But
this means that the infinitesimals are ‘disconnected’ from the standard num-
bers. It means that even an arbitrarily large transfinite ordinal cannot carry 
above a finite number value. One might sum this up by saying that infinitesi-
mals are not even ‘ordinal-Archimedean’ (as opposed to ‘natural number
Archimedean’).
4.1.1 Reply: The least upper bound principle
A response to Cantor’s objection was given by Zermelo in his comments on
Cantor’s cryptic argument ([1966], p. 439).21 He states that Cantor’s argument
establishes that the number !   does not exist, rather than that it does not
exceed the infinitesimals. In other words, multiplication of infinitesimals by
transfinite ordinal numbers is meaningless.
The theory NAP is neutral about the existence or non-existence of transfi-
nite ordinal numbers. So a fortiori it does not give a verdict about whether
multiplication of transfinite ordinals with infinitesimals makes sense. Rather,
it denies that the probability associated with the !-sequence
Pðf1gÞ;Pðf1; 2gÞ;Pðf1; 2; 3gÞ; . . .
is the least probability that is ‘infinitely larger’ than the probability of the point
events. The above !-sequence is indeed bounded, but it does not have a least
upper bound, since the range of our non-Archimedean probability functions is
not complete. Nonetheless, this sequence has a limit in a generalized sense (an
-limit). And the existence of this limit is sufficient for the existence of the
probability of any event in the sample space of the fair lottery on N.
In sum, there simply is no need for us to make sense of !   in order to
compute the probability of any event. Indeed, the theory of well-order types is
not the right tool for computing limits of non-standard probabilities.
21 For an extensive discussion of Cantor’s objections against infinitesimals, see (Ehrlich [2006]).
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4.2 Ticket missing from an infinite lottery
Williamson’s ([2007]) argument, which will be discussed shortly, involves
!-sequences of fair coin tosses that can be represented as a fair lottery on
the Cantor space 2N , which is a non-countably infinite sample space. We first
present a new argument against infinitesimals that is inspired by Williamson’s
argument, but which only requires a countably infinite sample space. As far as
we know, this variation is not endorsed by Williamson or any other author.
We present it as an intermediate step to clarify both the structure of the coin
toss argument and our reply to it.
Imagine an urn containing a countably infinite collection of tickets and a
mechanism to implement a fair lottery on the tickets in the urn.
In situation (1), all tickets are in the urn and we denote the probability of
winning of each arbitrary single ticket in such a lottery as ProbðE1Þ, leaving
open the possibility that this may be an infinitesimal.
In situation (2), one ticket is removed from the urn prior to the drawing of
the winning ticket. There is one competing ticket less, so the probability of
winning of each remaining ticket is ProbðE2Þ ¼ 11ProbðE1ÞProbðE1Þ (renorma-
lization). Taken in isolation, however, situation (2) looks exactly as before the
removal of a ticket, which is situation (1). Because of this isomorphism
between situation (1) and situation (2), we find that the probability of winning
of each individual ticket is equal to ProbðE2Þ ¼ ProbðE1Þ.
We have thus arrived at the following equations:
ProbðE2Þ ¼ 1
1 ProbðE1ÞProbðE1Þ;
ProbðE2Þ ¼ ProbðE1Þ:
Even in a non-Archimedean field, these equalities can only hold simulta-
neously if ProbðE1Þ ¼ ProbðE2Þ ¼ 0; it cannot be the case that ProbðE1Þ or
ProbðE2Þ is a non-zero infinitesimal.
4.2.1 Reply: Changing the sample space mid-game
For standard probability functions, the range is fixed to be the unit interval of
R. Nevertheless, changing the sample space mid-game is, in general, not
allowed, because the actual probability assignments still depend on the
sample space. For NAP functions, the dependence on the sample space is
more pronounced than for real-valued functions, because (the collection of
finite subsets of) the sample space is used explicitly to construct the hyperreal
field on which the function takes its values (see the Appendix for details).22
22 We are grateful to Marcus Pivato to encourage us to make this aspect more explicit.
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Moreover, even if the sample space is kept fixed, the way in which the event of
interest is embedded in the event space may influence the probabilities that are
assigned to events. This is clear in the uniform case (in which NAP coincides
with a non-Archimedean measure of relative sparseness, or normalized
numerosity), but the issue generalizes to the non-uniform case.
These observations can be related to what has earlier been discussed as a re-
labelling paradox (Bartha and Hitchcock [1999], Section 5). However, it is not
the labelling itself that is essential,23 but rather the choice of sample space and
the embedding of events therein, which requires a form of holism in the assign-
ment of probabilities that is captured by our demand for perfect additivity (see
also Hofweber [2014]).
We can construct an NAP function, P, that describes a fair lottery on N in a
regular way. This function will assign an infinitesimal probability to each single-
ton, namely, PðfngÞ ¼ 1= for all n 2 N (with  is the numerosity of N). The
function that we have thereby constructed crucially co-depends on the choice of
the sample space (in this case N). In particular, the non-Archimedean field on
which the probability function takes it values depends on this choice.
Given some countable collection of tickets, situation (1) is a fair lottery on
all of the tickets in this collection. The original argument only requires this
collection to be countably infinite, without further specification. Hence, we
need to fix a choice for the sample space before we can apply NAP to this
scenario. In model A, we choose N to play the role of the sample space A of
the probability function P. We use ProbAðE1Þ as shorthand for the probability
of winning of an arbitrary single ticket in situation (1) on model A. On model
A, event E1 is represented by singleton SE1 ¼ fng (for some n) of A. Clearly,
ProbAðE1Þ is equal to PðfngÞ ¼ 1= for any n 2 N.
Situation (2) is a fair lottery on all but one of the initial collection of tickets
(call this i). We use ProbAðE2Þ as shorthand for the probability of winning of
an arbitrary single ticket in situation (2) on model A. Since we are using the
same sample space as in the previous step, we can use the same probability
function, P, and find ProbAðE2Þ via conditionalization:
ProbAðE2Þ ¼ PðfngjNnfigÞ
¼ 1
 1 ðassuming n 2 Nnfig; 0 otherwiseÞ:
This entails that
ProbAðE2Þ ¼ 1
1 ProbAðE1ÞProbAðE1Þ:
23 We are grateful to Thomas Hofweber for pressing us on this point.
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Since in situation (2) one ticket is not playing any role, and we are still faced
with a countably infinite collection of tickets, we may consider representing
the remaining tickets by N instead of by Nnfig. This is fine too, but we should
realize that we can only do this by changing the sample space: we are now
switching from model A to a new model B. In model B, we use the same
probability function on the same sample space as in model A, but now
there is a different correspondence between sets in the event space and situa-
tions in the (hypothetical) world. In model A, we express the probability of a
single ticket from the whole collection of tickets as PðfngÞ ¼ 1=, whereas in
model B, PðfngÞ ¼ 1= is used to express the probability of a single ticket from
all but one of the initial collection of tickets.
The observation that E2 can be described with the same labels as E1 does not
show that ProbðE1Þ ¼ ProbðE2Þ (as was claimed in the initial presentation of
the objection), but only that ProbBðE2Þ ¼ ProbAðE1Þ.
In sum, we have:
ProbAðE2Þ ¼ 1
1 ProbAðE1ÞProbAðE1Þ;
ProbBðE2Þ ¼ ProbAðE1Þ:
This is insufficient to rule out the possibility that these probabilities might be
infinitesimals. For this to follow, it would need to be the case that
ProbAðE2Þ ¼ ProbBðE2Þ. The fact that model A and model B can both be
used to model the same situation, namely, situation (2), does not force this.
Using the initial notation, however, ProbAðE2Þ ¼ ProbBðE2Þ would be glossed
as ProbðE2Þ ¼ ProbðE2Þ, making it impossible to tell them apart. To model the
situation both before and after the removal of a ticket from the urn, we need a
model like model A. From the viewpoint of NAP, a ‘fair and countable
lottery’ is a highly underdetermined specification of a probability function
(see also Wenmackers and Horsten [2013]).
4.3 Williamson’s infinite sequence of coin tosses
Williamson ([2007]) has proposed an argument that purports to show that
infinitesimals cannot be used to describe the probability of a fully specific
outcome (for example, ‘all heads’) of a countably infinite sequences of
tosses with a fair coin (endorsed in Ha´jek [unpublished]).
Williamson considers two infinite sequences of fair and independent coin
tosses that all land heads: Hð1 . . .Þ and Hð2 . . .Þ. Hð1 . . .Þ is an !-sequence of
coin tosses that all land heads. Hð2 . . .Þ is the subsequence of Hð1 . . .Þ, which
consists of the second toss of Hð1 . . .Þ and all the coin tosses that follow it.
Williamson argues that
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ProbðHð1 . . .ÞÞ ¼ 1
2
ProbðHð2 . . .ÞÞ;
ProbðHð1 . . .ÞÞ ¼ ProbðHð2 . . .ÞÞ:
The assertion ProbðHð1 . . .ÞÞ ¼ 1
2
ProbðHð2 . . .ÞÞ follows from the fairness and
independence of the coin tosses, together with the finite additivity property.
The assertion ProbðHð1 . . .ÞÞ ¼ ProbðHð2 . . .ÞÞ is motivated by a symmetry
consideration: as physical processes, ProbðHð1 . . .ÞÞ and ProbðHð2 . . .ÞÞ are
isomorphic.
But even in non-Archimedean fields these two equalities can hold simulta-
neously only if ProbðHð1 . . .ÞÞ ¼ ProbðHð2 . . .ÞÞ ¼ 0; it cannot be the case that
ProbðHð1 . . .ÞÞ or ProbðHð2 . . .ÞÞ is a non-zero infinitesimal. The conclusion
that ProbðHð1 . . .ÞÞ ¼ ProbðHð2 . . .ÞÞ ¼ 0 is of course exactly what classical
probability theory tells us it has to be.
4.3.1 Reply: The embedding of events in a sample space
Williamson’s argument turns on the claim that the sequences Hð1 . . .Þ
and Hð2 . . .Þ are identical in all relevant aspects (they are ‘isomorphic’).
This, however, is challenged by Weintraub ([2008]). She claims that the fact
that Hð2 . . .Þ is a proper subset of Hð1 . . .Þ is significant.
Weintraub’s reply is correct as far as it goes, but it seems incomplete. A
further point is that, as discussed in Section 4.2, the assignment of probabil-
ities does not make sense in the absence of a well-defined sample space that is
applied in a consistent way. In the case of Williamson’s argument, a crucial
aspect of fixing the sample space is an answer to the question, ‘When does the
count of events start?’.
Let 2N be the sample space of model A, which reflects that the count of
events starts at the first toss of Hð1 . . .Þ. Let C ¼ 2Nnf1g be the conditioning
event, which reflects that the count of events starts at the first toss of Hð2 . . .Þ.
In model B, the sample space is also 2N . Although it is the same set as in model
A, this set is now used in a different way, namely, to reflect that the count of
events starts at the first toss of Hð2 . . .Þ.
We again introduce some shorthand notations. In situation T1, a coin
is tossed on all of some countably infinite collection of occasions. We use
ProbAðHð1 . . .ÞÞ as shorthand for the probability that such a coin comes
up heads each time on model A. In situation T2, a coin is tossed on all but
one (the first) of the countably infinite collection of occasions. We use ProbA
ðHð2 . . .ÞÞ as shorthand for the probability that such a coin comes up heads
each of the remaining occasions on model A and ProbBðHð2 . . .ÞÞ for the
corresponding probability on model B.
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Williamson exploits the intuition that ProbAðHð1 . . .ÞÞ ¼ ProbBðHð2 . . .ÞÞ.
But he glosses this as ProbðHð1 . . .ÞÞ ¼ ProbðHð2 . . .ÞÞ, thus turning the prob-
abilities involved into evaluations within the same model. On the other hand,
Williamson convincingly argues that ProbðHð1 . . .ÞÞ ¼ 1
2
ProbðHð2 . . .ÞÞ.
Although we would rather represent this as ProbAðHð1 . . .ÞÞ ¼
1
2
ProbAðHð2 . . .ÞÞ, leaving out the choice of model here is not as harmful as
before, since we are now comparing probabilities within the same model, in
the sense that the sample space 2N is used in the same way. The two glosses
indeed contradict each other unless ProbðHð1 . . .ÞÞ ¼ ProbðHð2 . . .ÞÞ ¼ 0. But
the contradiction can only be obtained when the difference between the sample
spaces is glossed over. In particular, there is no uniform application of an NAP
model, M, such that ProbMðHð1 . . .ÞÞ ¼ ProbMðHð2 . . .ÞÞ can be obtained.
At this point, it may be asked what the ‘correct’ sample space for evaluating
the probability of Hð1 . . .Þ and of Hð2 . . .Þ is. In this article, we do not commit
ourselves to there being a single correct sample space for evaluating probabil-
ities associated with idealized scenarios such as lotteries on infinite spaces (see
Section 6.1.1). But if what Williamson is envisaging is a possible physical
universe consisting of an !-sequence of coin tosses starting with toss
number 1 (rather than with toss number 2), and if we regard the probabilities
of the two sequences as objective probabilities, then evidently model A is the
correct setting for evaluating both ProbðHð1 . . .ÞÞ and ProbðHð2 . . .ÞÞ.24
4.4 Point sets on a circle
Williamson’s argument crucially turns on translation symmetry.25 Other sym-
metry considerations can be invoked to arrive at the same conclusion in other
examples with a similar structure. Parker ([2013]) has given one such argument
that turns on rotation symmetry; see also (Bernstein and Wattenberg [1969];
Barrett [2010]).
Consider the unit circle. Select the point on the circle with coordinates (1, 0),
and let it be called p1. Now move an arc length 1 clockwise along the circle
from this point; call this point on the circle p2. Again move arc length 1
clockwise along the circle to obtain p2. Continuing in this way, and taking
account of the irrationality of the length of the unit circle, we obtain an !-
sequence p1; p2; p3; . . . of points on the unit circle. Now abstract from the
24 Williamson ([2007]) also considers a second sequence of tosses with a separate coin, which is
tossed at the same points in time as the first coin, except that the second coin’s first toss occurs at
the first coin’s second toss. Even without analysing it in full, it ought to be clear that considering
two coins allows for even more freedom in choosing the sample space and embedding the events
in it. So, we agree with Hofweber ([2014]) and Easwaran ([2014]) that the probability associated
with the second sequence resulting in all heads does not need to equal that of Hð2 . . .Þ.
25 In particular, on a temporal translation symmetry. It could be turned into a spatial translation
symmetry by considering a countably infinite row of coins that are tossed simultaneously.
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ordering to obtain set fp1; p2; p3; . . .g of points on the circle; call this set S1.
Rotating the !-sequence p1; p2; p3; . . . by arc length 1 yields the set
fp2; p3; p4 . . .g; call this set S2. Now consider the probabilities, ProbðS1Þ and
ProbðS2Þ, of a point on the circle being in S1 or S2, respectively. Invariance of
probability under rotation symmetry suggests that ProbðS2Þ ¼ ProbðS1Þ. But
if, in addition, the probability of a point being identical with pi is equal for
each i 2 N (uniformity), then since ProbðS1Þ ¼ ProbðS2Þ þ Probðfp1gÞ, pi must
be zero for each i 2 N. In particular, point events cannot be assigned non-zero
infinitesimal probability values. Again we have an a priori, conceptual argu-
ment for the conclusion that classical probability theory models fair lotteries
on uncountable sets correctly.
It will be clear to the reader by now that our diagnosis of the argument from
rotational symmetry against infinitesimal probabilities is structurally identical
to our diagnosis of Williamson’s argument. Hence, we do not describe it in
detail here.
4.5 Easwaran and Pruss
Easwaran ([2014]) has proposed a conceptually new argument to the
effect that infinitesimals cannot be used to describe the fair lottery on the
Cantor space 2N . He aims to show that for every infinitesimal  we have
that ProbðHð1 . . .ÞÞ > ; where Hð1 . . .Þ is againWilliamson’s infinite sequence
of coin tosses. If this is so, then ProbðHð1 . . .ÞÞ can indeed not be an infinite-
simal. The subsequence Hð2 . . .Þ does not play a role in Easwaran’s argument.
Instead, he considers Hð1 . . .NÞ: a sequence of heads of non-standard length,
where N is an infinite hypernatural number of heads.
His argument goes as follows: Consider a standard infinite sequence of coin
tosses of all heads, Hð1 . . .Þ. Now take any infinitesimal, . Then 1 > n for any
n 2 N. Now take a non-standard integer power 2N such that
2N 5
1

	 2ð2N Þ:
Such a non-standard integer power must exist,26 and this number, N,
must then be an infinite hypernatural number. Now consider the probability
ProbðHð1 . . .NÞÞ of the non-standard (hyperfinite) sequence of N heads. Then
we have
26 By the ‘transfer principle’ for NSA. This principle says that if a first-order property holds of the
standard real numbers, then it also holds of the non-standard reals. In the case under considera-
tion, the property in question is
y > 1!9n 2 N : 2n5 y5 2nþ1:
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ProbðHð1 . . .ÞÞ  ProbðHð1 . . .NÞÞ ¼ 1
2N
> ;
which yields the desired result. Easwaran’s conclusion is not that the prob-
abilities involved should all be zero, but rather that it is illegitimate to compare
probabilities on standard sample spaces to probabilities on non-standard
sample spaces.
Easwaran’s argument is closely related to the following recent argument
against infinitesimals put forward by Pruss ([2014], Section 3): Suppose
that Prob1 is a probability function on N that assigns an infinitesimal  > 0
to every singleton and represents a countably infinite fair lottery. Choose a
hypernatural infinite number M so that 1 is much larger than M. Now consider
an infinite lottery on the infinite set f1; . . . ;Mg. While in the case of a fair
lottery on N it is perhaps not clear which infinitesimal should represent the
probability of a singleton, there is an obvious answer as to what that infini-
tesimal probability here should be: Prob2ð nf gÞ ¼ 1M for all n 2 f1; . . . ;Mg. But
we know that N ˆ f1; . . . ;Mg. So we are in a situation where the probability of
drawing the winning ticket in a fair lottery with more tickets is higher than
that of drawing the winning ticket in a lottery with fewer tickets. This is
patently unreasonable.
Before presenting the former argument, Pruss offers an argument that he calls
an ‘intuition pump’. He compares an assignment of (not necessarily equal)
infinitesimal probability values to each singleton of N to the countably additive
function that assigns probability 1=2n to the singleton n for each n 2 N.27 Pruss
observes that, in the former case, the probability assigned to each singleton is
infinitely smaller than the probability assigned to it in the latter case. By an
analogy to the former case, he argues that this cannot be correct.
4.5.1 Reply: Internal versus external probabilities
The crucial move in Easwaran’s argument was the introduction of a probabil-
ity assigned to a non-standard sequence N of heads; he assumes this probability
has to be 1
2N
. This is not true in NAP, which will assign a strictly smaller
probability value to this event. Likewise, the crucial move in Pruss’s argument
was the introduction of a probability assigned to a particular outcome of a
27 Observe that the countably additive function 1=2n is not an NAP function. In particular, it is not
normalized: the NAP sum yields 1 1=2 rather than 1. For the relevant NAP function, it holds
8n 2 N that
Pð nf gÞ ¼ 1
2n
 2

2  1 ;
which differs pointwise by an infinitesimal from the function Pruss considers.
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lottery on infinite hyperfinite set f1; . . . ;Mg; he assumes this probability has to
be 1
M
. Again, NAP assigns a strictly smaller probability value to this event.
To argue for these claims, we first make two statements that are indispu-
tably correct, then try to combine them into a contradiction, and show why
this fails. For a fair lottery on N, NAP assigns 1 as the probability of a
particular singleton outcome. For a fair lottery on the infinite hyperfinite set
f1; . . . ;Ng, an internal probability theory assigns 1
N
as the probability of a
particular outcome.28 Now it may seem like we can arrive at a contradiction:
N ˆ f1; . . . ;Ng for any infinite N. Yet, by choosing N ' , ‘the probability’ of
a singleton event is smaller on a strictly smaller sample space (1 '
1
N
).
The contradiction is only apparent, however, since we are mixing assign-
ments across probability theories—that is why we put ‘the probability’ between
quotation marks: different theories may assign probability values differently. If
we want to compare probability values in a meaningful way, we have to do this
in a context that allows us to assign probabilities to all events of interest.
In order to explain this, we have to introduce a technical distinction familiar from
non-standardmodel theory: it is the distinction between internal and external objects
in the non-standard universe. ‘Internal’ refers to information available from within
the non-standardmodel using the transfer principle, which only applies to first-order
properties. ‘External’ refers to information available in the non-standard universe in
which the non-standard model is embedded—concerning properties that cannot be
obtained by transfer alone. Internal approaches to probability theory do not assign
probabilities to lotteries on N (or on any infinite standard domain), since these sets
are external objects in the non-standardmodel. Hence, such theories do not allow us
to compare a lottery on N to a hyperfinite lottery at all. In such a context, these sets
are incommensurable, and there is no contradiction.
In contrast, NAP is an external approach to probability theory. It has been
claimed that external probability functions cannot assign probabilities to
hyperfinite lotteries (Easwaran [2014], p. 27). However, NAP functions can
do this; it requires a second iteration of the range-building procedure and the
results are different from those of an internal approach. Since this is an
important point, we elaborate on it. Although we originally intended NAP
theory to model probability functions on standard domains (cf. Table 1), our
formalism is perfectly general. Its machinery can be used to construct a uni-
form probability distribution on an infinite hyperfinite set f1; . . . ;Ng.
Moreover, since NAP yields total probability functions, the NAP function
on f1; . . . ;Ng will also assign a probability to the sub-event N: a fundamental
reason for taking NAP to be preferable over Nelson’s theory. The NAP value
associated with a singleton event on f1; . . . ;Ng will not be equal to 1
N
. Instead,
28 This can be obtained directly by considering fair lotteries on finite sample spaces and by apply-
ing the transfer principle from NSA to it; see, in particular, Nelson’s ([1987]) probability theory.
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it will be a strictly smaller infinitesimal. This ought to be clear immediately,
since NAP functions respect the Euclidean principle. For instance, for the
probability of ticket 1 winning in a fair lottery on f1; . . . ;Ng we have:
Pð1j 1; . . . ;Nf gÞ5Pð1jNÞ ¼ 1

:
So, in NAP the events are comparable, yet there is no contradiction either.
Another way to see this is via an analogy with set size: the numerosity
assigned to N is  and the internal cardinality of f1; . . . ;Ng is N, which may
be chosen smaller than . Yet, this does not suffice to conclude that ‘the size’
of N is strictly smaller than that of a strict superset. To compare sizes, we have
to pick a particular theory for assigning sizes. N has no internal cardinality, so
this measure is not useful for comparing its size with a hyperfinite set.
However, N and f1; . . . ;Ng do have an external cardinality and a numerosity
and for f1; . . . ;Ng both of these measures are (much) larger than N.29
In short, the way in which NAP describes a (fair) lottery on a hyperfinite set
is fundamentally different from the way in which Nelson’s theory describes it.
In an internal theory, we perform one ultrafilter construction and within the
resulting ultrapower model find a non-standard number, N, and the probabil-
ity values associated with a fair lottery on f1; . . . ;Ng. In the NAP description,
however, we need two ultrafilter constructions to find an NAP function that
describes a fair lottery on a hyperfinite set. In particular, if we already have an
NAP function that describes a fair lottery on N, in general the probability
values required to describe a fair lottery on N or infinite hyperfinite subsets
thereof will not yet be in the range of this function. A second NAP construc-
tion is required to obtain the required range.
Regarding Pruss’s intuition pump, in this example all finite initial segments
of sums of probabilities of singletons are such that the former is infinitely
smaller than the latter. The intuition pump only works if we assume that
this implies that the same holds for the infinite sum. However, in the case of
NAP and the corresponding non-Archimedean limit of the sum, the implica-
tion does not hold. The key observation is that in order to determine which
sum is larger, one has to compare the summands (as Pruss does) as well as the
sum operation. The standard infinite sum, appropriate for adding CA prob-
ability values, is fundamentally different to the non-Archimedean sum
(Section 3.4) that is appropriate for summing NAP values.
29 N is the internal cardinality of f1; . . . ;Ng, which means that there is no internal bijection of
f1; . . . ;Ng onto a smaller initial segment of the hypernatural numbers. However, the external
cardinality of f1; . . . ;Ng is much bigger than N: there exist no external bijection of N onto
f1; . . . ;Ng, so the set f1; . . . ;Ng has uncountably many elements. For the distinction between
internal and external cardinality, see, for instance (Albeverio et al. [1986], p. 67).
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5 Dividends
Now that the objections against non-Archimedean probabilities have been
addressed, we turn to the advantages of using non-Archimedean probabilities.
We describe problems that classical probability theory cannot model in a
satisfactory manner, but which can be modelled elegantly by NAP.
5.1 Measure and utility
According to classical probability theory, uncountable sample spaces contain
non-measurable subsets (Truss [1997], Chapter 11, Section 4). The probability
functions that are produced by NAP are ‘total’: they assign probabilities to all
subsets of the sample space, which can be finite, countably infinite, or uncoun-
table. This is a virtue of the account, as non-measurable sets are widely
regarded as ‘pathologies’ by probability theorists.
If NAP is adopted, then utilities can be calculated in the usual way even for
events that are judged to be non-measurable by classical probability theory.
Contingent events that have measure zero on the classical theory can have a
non-zero probability if NAP is adopted. Thus NAP seems to provide a sui-
table background theory for a utility theory for infinite spaces.
Mixing hyperreal probability assignments with standard utility theory may
lead to sub-optimal results. A non-Archimedean utility theory for infinite
outcome spaces has been worked out by Pivato ([2014]) and by Pedersen
([unpublished]).30 In the resulting theory, utilities do not satisfy the
Archimedean principle. As Pivato himself notes, this is not a defect of the
theory since many utility theorists are wary of this principle as a constraint on
utilities (see, for example, Krantz et al. [1971], Sections 1.5.2, 6.5.1, and 9.1).
5.2 Regularity and uniformity
Lewis ([1980]) has argued that only impossible events must be assigned prob-
ability zero, that is, probability functions should be ‘regular’. The main reason
for this requirement is that probability functions ought to be maximally fine-
grained; they are expected to distinguish between impossibility and infinitely
improbable contingency. Lewis’s stance harmonizes with our preferred non-
standard probability theory. We have seen that NAP gives us ways of building
regular probability functions even for infinite sample spaces. Indeed, NAP
functions satisfy the Euclidean principle. The fineness of the grain is always
sufficient for the problem at hand, since the range of the NAP function is
constructed using the relevant domain.
30 As mentioned before, Pivato’s construction of non-standard utility functions for infinite sets of
outcomes is very similar to the construction of NAP models.
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It is sometimes held that for reasons of symmetry, certain uniformity
assumptions should also be imposed. This lies behind versions of Laplace’s
([1902]) principle of insufficient reason, later called the ‘principle of indiffer-
ence’. So one might require that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, all
atomic propositions should be given the same probability value. It is well
known that the fact that sample spaces can be carved up in different ways
spells trouble for the principle of indifference (see van Fraassen [1989],
Chapter 12). Nonetheless, uniform probability distributions on infinite
spaces, and even regular uniform distributions, certainly seem conceptually
possible. So our probability theory should at least allow for them; this is
captured in our demand of weak Laplacianism that was discussed in the
introduction, and which is satisfied by NAP.
In sum, even if we agree with those philosophers of probability who argue
that the principle of indifference involves an illegitimate inference from ignor-
ance to knowledge, the regular uniform probability distributions on infinite
sample spaces should fall within the scope of the mathematical treatment of
probability.
5.3 Credence and chance
Perhaps the best known principle relating subjective probability and chance is
Lewis’s ([1980]) principal principle, which can be roughly stated as follows:
ProbðAjChðAÞ ¼ xÞ ¼ x;
where ‘Prob’ is subjective probability, Ch is a chance measure, and x is a real
number.
In classical probability theory, it would seem that if A represents the value
of a continuous observable (say, a position measurement for an electron in a
superposition state), Ch(A) will be zero in a non-determinist context for
every value A. Hence, according to Lewis’s principal principle
ProbðAjChðAÞ ¼ 0Þ ¼ 0. This will render any probability conditional on the
posterior ProbðAÞ undefined, essentially leading to the problems flagged in
Section 2.2. NAP can guarantee regularity, so non-zero infinitesimal values
can unproblematically be assigned to Ch(A) in such cases. Indeed, Lewis
himself advocated the use of infinitesimal probabilities both for subjective
credences and for objective chances for precisely such reasons.
In addition, NAP contains the resources for resolving the so-called zero-fit
problem for classical probability, which goes as follows: Suppose that the
actual world is a ‘Williamson-world’. It consists entirely of an !-sequence,
A, of coin tosses (not necessarily fair). And suppose that the world is chancy.
In particular, it is governed by a law that states that the limiting relative
frequency of heads is 1
10
.31 Then we can define a notion of ‘goodness of fit’
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of a hypothesis with respect to the actual world. We say that hypothesis T1 has
better fit than T2 if and only if ChðAjT1Þ > ChðAjT2Þ.
But this presents a problem for classical probability. Let T1 be the ‘right’
theory: it says that the limiting frequency of actual coin tosses is 1
10
. And let T2
be a theory that fits less well: it says that the limiting frequency lies in the
interval ½ 1
20
; 1
2
. Kolmogorov’s principles require that ChðX jT1Þ must be zero
for almost all !-sequences X that satisfy T1 (since there are continuum many
such). Indeed, if there are no further laws governing the actual world beside
T1, then ChðX jT1Þ will have to be zero for all !-sequences X that satisfy T1.
But that means that classical probability predicts that the fit of T1 is no better
than that of T2, which is incorrect.
Again, NAP can be used to generate chance functions that assign non-zero
(but infinitesimal) chances only to !-sequences X that satisfy T1. Then, by the
Euclidean principle (satisfied by NAP), ChðAjT1Þ > ChðAjT2Þ, which is the
right outcome.
Lewis’s principal principle assumes that for each moment in time there
exists a unique objective physical chance function that governs physical
events in the actual world. In the present article we do not wish to commit
ourselves to this assumption. Indeed, whereas this assumption is compatible
with everything that is claimed in this article, it is not a view that is congenial
to the spirit of NAP. We will return to this issue below (see Section 6.1.1).
5.4 Conditional probability
In Section 2, we discussed three problems due to the assignment of
probability zero to contingent events in the (semi-)classical approach and
mentioned that they can also be addressed without the use of non-
Archimedean probabilities. One of these approaches consists in regarding
conditional probabilities as the fundamental notion; Popper functions are
one way of realizing this idea. Another approach is to consider sequences of
probability functions: lexicographical probabilities. In this section, we explore
the relations between NAP and these alternatives (although we will not be able
to do justice to their history here).
NAP is based on axioms phrased in terms of unconditional (or absolute)
probability functions, just as Kolmogorov’s axioms. Nevertheless, conditional
(or relative) probabilities play a central role in the construction of
31 This example is taken from (Elga [2004]). Observe that an NAP function describing a coin with a
fixed bias is not the same as an NAP function that expresses a law concerning its limiting
frequency. The prior NAP function is regular on 2N and assigns some non-zero probability
to sequences with a limiting frequency unequal to the bias (such as a sequence of all heads
produced by a fair coin). By conditionalizing on the relevant hypothesis, a posterior NAP
function can assign probability zero to all sequences in 2N that do not have the required limiting
frequency.
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unconditional NAP functions, just as they do in the classical theory (recall the
CPP in Section 3.2). So, the mathematics of NAP harmonizes with the philo-
sophical observation that the notion of conditional probability is at least as
fundamental as that of unconditional probability (see, for example, Ha´jek
[2003]). Hence, it should not come as a surprise that deep connections exist
between NAP functions and axiomatizations phrased in terms of conditional
probability functions.
Even if conditional probabilities with impossible antecedents are meaning-
less, conditional probabilities involving infinitely unlikely contingencies
should be well defined. As mentioned before, in the fair lottery on N or R,
for instance, it seems that we ought to be able to say that
Probð 1f gj 1; 2; 3f gÞ ¼ 1
3
. On the (semi-)classical description of infinite lotteries,
all such conditional probabilities are undefined. Precisely for this reason,
Popper functions have been introduced.
A Popper function is a (non-classical) conditional probability function
C(A, B) that is defined for all A;B 2 PðÞ (where  is a finite or infinite
sample space). Popper functions take their values in the real interval ½0; 1,
just like classical probability functions. If E 6¼ ;, then Cð;EÞ is required to be
a classical probability function.32 The conditional probability Cð;;Þ is defined
as one. This is an arbitrary choice; it reflects the fact that we do not care what
value is assigned to events conditional on an impossible event.33 A notion of
unconditional probability can be defined in terms of a given Popper function
as follows: ProbðAÞ ¼ CðA;Þ, where is the sample space. The crucial point
is that Popper functions impose restrictions on Cð;EÞ even if E is an event
that has unconditional probability zero. This is where Popper functions differ
from classical probability functions. In the example concerning the lottery of
the natural numbers above, a description in terms of Popper functions will
indeed predict that Cð 1f g; 1; 2; 3f gÞ ¼ 1
3
. Thus Popper functions generate an
interesting account of conditional probabilities.
NAP can be seen as a generalization of classical probability. It is not hard to
see that the following representation theorem holds (Benci et al. [2013]):
Theorem 4
(1) For every classical probability function, PK, there exists an NAP
function P that is pointwise infinitely close to it, that is, for every E
such that PK ðEÞ is defined, jPK ðEÞ  PðEÞj5 r for every r > 0 2 R.
32 So, in that case we require Cð;EÞ to satisfy -additivity. Totality and -additivity are not
imposed by all authors and in general cannot be satisfied jointly.
33 For a complete list of the axioms governing Popper functions and a discussion of it, see (McGee
[1994]). It may be more natural to leave Cð;;Þ undefined; see, for instance, (Easwaran [2014], p.
16).
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(2) For every NAP function, P, there is a classical probability function,
PK, that is infinitely close to it for every event on which the latter is
defined.
There exists a representation theorem relating regular non-standard prob-
ability functions that only satisfy finite additivity (and not necessarily NAP’s
infinite additivity property) on the one hand, and Popper functions on the
other hand (see Krauss [1968]; McGee [1994]). However, Brickhill and
Horsten ([unpublished]) has recently shown that this result can be strength-
ened to a representation theorem that relates regular (and perfectly additive)
NAP functions with Popper functions34:
Theorem 5
(1) For every Popper function, Cð; Þ, there exists an NAP function, P,
that is pointwise infinitely close to it.
(2) For every NAP function, P, there is a Popper function, Cð; Þ, that is
pointwise infinitely close to it.
So, NAP functions can be regarded as generalizations of Popper functions.
However, since even infinitesimal differences may change the order of NAP
values, corresponding Popper functions and NAP functions may lead to dif-
ferent decisions (see the following section).
Popper functions are related by means of representation theorems to classes
of classical probability functions.35 So, indirectly, the representation theorems
of Krauss, McGee, and Brickhill connect non-standard probabilities to classes
of classical probability functions.
Since the work of Adams, classical probability functions play a central role
in the theory of indicative and subjunctive conditionals. But it is well known
that conditionals with contingent probability zero antecedents cannot be trea-
ted in a satisfactory manner.36 Popper functions have been used to construct
better theories of conditional sentences (Leitgeb ([2012]). Given the connec-
tion between Popper functions and NAP functions, it is clear that there is an
important role to be played here for non-standard probability theories, too.
Popper functions have in turn been related to possible worlds semantics for
counterfactuals (Leitgeb [2012]), Part A, Section 3). So, again, there is a deep
relation between possible worlds semantics for conditionals and NAP models.
34 The proof of the second part of this theorem is easy; the proof of the first part is much more
complicated.
35 See (van Fraasen [1976]), which associates finite dimensions with Popper functions. For NAP
functions, van Fraassen’s notion of dimension can be extended into the transfinite. It would take
us too far afield to pursue this in the present article. See also (Csa´sza´r [1955]); Re´nyi [1956]).
36 Such as, ‘If in the lottery on the natural numbers ticket 3 is (was) drawn, then one of the tickets 1,
2, 3 is (was) drawn’.
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Conditional probabilities play a prominent role in learning from evidence.
They figure crucially in standard update rules. In classical probability theory,
we cannot use Bayes’s rule, for instance, to learn from infinitely improbable
contingencies that actually obtain. They cannot be used to update our sub-
jective probability distribution in such situations. But if our subjective prob-
ability distribution is regular, then Bayes’s rule can be used to revise our
probability distribution.37
Halpern ([2010]) has carried out a systematic investigation of the relation-
ships between non-standard probability spaces, conditional probability spaces
(including Popper spaces), and lexicographical probability spaces. However,
his results do not suffice to show how NAP spaces relate to the two other
approaches, since the non-standard probability spaces considered by Halpern
lack the perfect additivity property that is encoded by axiom NAP4 (which
was not formulated at the time). Instead, Halpern ([2010], p. 166) considered a
pointwise limit on the hyperreals to obtain a proxy for countable additivity
that applies to non-standard probabilities. We suspect that considering NAP
spaces may lead to an interesting restriction on the class of lexicographical
probability spaces with which they are equivalent.
6 General Considerations
In this final section, we consider misgivings that are somewhat more diffuse,
and that relate to more general philosophical questions about the nature of
probability and about the way in which probability relates to the real world. In
particular, we address the non-uniqueness of NAP functions and revisit the
failure of NAP to validate certain invariance principles. We will see that these
issues are connected.
In the introduction, we motivated NAP on the basis of four desiderata
(regularity, totality, perfect additivity, and weak Laplacianism). The existence
of models for NAP theory shows that these four initial desiderata can be
combined in a consistent way. We may consider further desiderata, but not
all subsets of these desiderata can be combined harmoniously within a single,
consistent probability theory. In particular, the desideratum of totality is in
tension with that of uniqueness and the desideratum of regularity is in tension
with that of invariance.38
37 Pruss ([2012]) argues that updating on infinitesimal probabilities is coherent but can give coun-
terintuitive results in certain situations. We reserve discussion of Pruss’s objection for another
occasion.
38 It has also been observed by Skyrms ([1980], Appendix 4) that there is a trade-off between
various requirements—he considered additivity, translation invariance, totality, and regulari-
ty—for standard and non-standard measures.
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6.1 Non-uniqueness
NAP functions are non-unique in the following sense: Given a conceptually
possible probabilistic scenario, there may be uncountably many NAP func-
tions that describe the scenario equally well. The functions differ from each
other because their construction relies on a different free ultrafilter (see
Appendix). Although not any free ultrafilter will do,39 the relevant collection
still contains uncountably many filters.40
Given a particular subset of the sample space, this plurality of ultrafilters
may lead to variations in the associated NAP values. The difference between
two NAP assignments to an event that does not receive a classical probability
value may be non-infinitesimal (and, in some cases, as high as one minus an
infinitesimal). Concerning a non-standard probability function for a fair lot-
tery on the natural numbers from (Wenmackers and Horsten [2013]), Kremer
([2014]) has shown that there is a set that can be given any rational number
between zero and one as (the standard part of) its probability value; this
observation generalizes to NAP.
Offhand, this non-uniqueness seems undesirable. However, Kremer sug-
gests that ‘maybe this indeterminacy is a feature, not a bug’, because intui-
tively it is not clear at all what probability should be assigned to the set that he
constructs. In order to assess the issue of non-uniqueness, we first discuss all
the parameters that need to be fixed to define an NAP space and how these
choices relate to the notion of uniquely determined physical chance.
6.1.1 Parameters and objective probability
An NAP space is a triple h;w;UPfinðÞi, with  a sample space, w a real-
valued weight function defined on the elements of , and UPfinðÞ an ultrafilter
on the class of finite subsets of  (see Section 3.5). (We focus on situations
where  is infinite.)
This means that in order to model a given conceptually possible probabil-
istic situation, three choices need to be made. The first two choices are familiar
from classical probability theory. If one believes in the existence of objective
probabilities, then these choices can be constrained: one can require  to be a
subset of the ‘universal sample space’ of physically possible point events, and
one can take the weight function to be physically determined.
In the classical setting, a third choice has to be made (in uncountably infinite
sample spaces): one has to pick a -algebra of events. The defender of NAP
also has a third choice to make: the choice of an ultrafilter. In both
39 We need a fine ultrafilter (see Kanamori [1994], p. 301) and may impose further conditions on
the filter (as discussed, for instance, in (Benci et al. [2013], Section 5.2).
40 For an infinite set of cardinality , there are 22

ultrafilters to choose from.
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approaches, this third choice may involve arbitrariness. In the classical setting,
when totality fails, we have to take some sets to be non-measurable. It is not
easy to convince oneself that the subsets of that are non-measurable have no
probability (physical propensity) of occurring, but we leave that as a problem
for the classical probabilist who is also a fan of objective probabilities. Of
course, the classical probabilist is not forced to take this position; if she is a
subjectivist, then she will take the weight function to be an expression of a
person’s subjective expectations.
In NAP, the ultrafilter is defined on a ‘directed set’, , which is included in,
but does not have to be all of,PfinðÞ. In (Benci et al. [2013], Section 5), we have
shown how choosing a smaller (which also reduces the number of ultrafilters)
influences the properties of the resulting NAP function. Nonetheless, it is hard
to see how one could ever have conclusive grounds for preferring one particular
ultrafilter over all the others (see also Wenmackers and Horsten [2013], Section
6.2). A fan of objective probability can probably still maintain that the choice of
ultrafilter is, ultimately, physically determined. Nonetheless, given the empirical
inaccessibility of this ultrafilter,41 this position does not help us to select a
unique NAP function in our models.
So on both the classical approach and in NAP, probability is partially
arbitrary, in the sense that it involves a choice that is not empirically acces-
sible. Once a choice has been made (for a particular -algebra of events or an
ultrafilter, respectively), the probability function is unique (relative to this
choice).42 Even if it is assumed that there is a single true -algebra of events
or ultrafilter, it is empirically inaccessible, so making a particular choice to
represent this physical chance function remains partially arbitrary.
Thus, at most, we can hold that the probability of physical events is objec-
tive in a weaker sense. What one could say is the following: There is such a
thing as physical chance. And it is a legitimate task of our mathematical
models to track this property. But our models can only track physical
chance in a mediated way. In order to describe a physical system and its
behaviour, our probabilistic models have to select a sample space and label
the point events (that is, establish a connection between reality and point
events in the model). For finite sample spaces, the labelling does not matter;
but for infinite sample spaces, different labellings can result in different prob-
ability assignments. All this induces a degree of relativity in probability values
of events. But it in no way contradicts the objectivity of physical chance.
41 We can only perform finitely many experiments. Hence, even if we would assume that there is
such a thing as a particular ultrafilter in reality, there is no way to establish empirically which
one it is.
42 In the real-valued case, it is well known that we can trade this partial arbitrariness of the event
space (due to the failure of totality) for the partial arbitrariness of measure values (due to failure
of uniqueness) by introducing generalized limits (or Banach limits); see, for instance,
(Wenmackers and Horsten [2013], Section 3.2).
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We advocate an even weaker position vis-a`-vis the objectivity issue. As
stated in the introduction, we see the task of probability as being one of
mathematically modelling ‘conceptually possible’ probabilistic situations
(weak Laplacianism). The resulting mathematical models should preserve as
much of our pre-theoretical intuitions concerning probability as possible.
Viewed in this light, the choice of an ultrafilter does not appear to be a
problem, for there is no reason to assume that there is a unique best way to
model certain infinite probabilistic situations (such as infinite lotteries).
6.1.2 Order and subjective probability
The regularity axiom NAP1 and the associated Euclidean principle require prob-
ability values to respect the ordering induced by the subset relation on the event
space. The sum and product rule require numerical probabilities to have more
structure than just this partial order: we require the probability values to be part
of a totally ordered field of numbers. Hence the subset relation underdetermines
the order of the probability values. We need an additional degree of freedom to
allow for various kinds of probability assignments to the same event space.
In part, this is accomplished by selecting a weight function (Section 3.5),
which encodes probability relations between atomic events, and thus the order
between many disjoint events (in particular, for finite and co-finite events). But
the subset relation together with a specification of a weight function still
underdetermines the order of the probability values.43 For some events, the
difference in probability can be more than infinitesimal, depending on the
properties of the free ultrafilter.44 Yet, even infinitesimal differences may
change the order (for example, in a fair lottery on the natural numbers, the
probability of the set of even numbers may be equal to or infinitesimally
smaller than that of the set of odd numbers).
The observation that the subset relation is a partial order whereas any sort
of numbers (real or hyperreal) require a total order has been made by others,
and recently by Hofweber ([2014]) and Easwaran ([2014]). Easwaran observes
that real-valued probability functions leave out part of the structure of the
partial order, whereas hyperreal-valued probability functions add structure in
an arbitrary way. He prefers the former approach, since even if one assigns
probabilities to an algebra, one can still consult the order of the subset relation
43 In the context of real-valued probabilities, this has prompted some researchers to strengthen the
notion of ‘uniformity’ on a countably infinite sample space beyond the assignment of equal
weights to atomic events. Kerkvliet and Meester ([2016]) assign uniquely determined,
real-valued probabilities to a large collection of subsets of the sample space. Although their
results may lead to interesting suggestions to explore in the context of NAP, we do not pursue
those here.
44 In the case of a fair lottery inN, these are the sets that do not have an asymptotic density (see, for
example, Wenmackers and Horsten [2013], Section 3.1). In general, a necessary (not sufficient)
condition is for the event to be infinite and not co-finite.
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on the algebra. Nothing prevents you from using both sources of information
when you have to make decisions. For instance, if you get the opportunity to
choose between betting on the occurrence of {1} and of {1, 2} in a lottery on N
or R, both real-valued probabilities are zero, but that does not prevent you
from preferring the largest event.
One might think that ignoring relevant existing structure (a sin of omission)
is not as grave as adding structure (a sin of misinformation).45 However, it has
to be borne in mind that one can always consider the entire family of NAP
functions modelling a given situation, rather than an—arbitrary—representa-
tive of it (see also Wenmackers and Horsten [2013]). Such a family is the set of
all NAP functions that meet a common specification, such as ‘a fair lottery on
R’, which fixed the sample space and the weight function, and possibly addi-
tional constraints on the directed set. As a whole, the family shows us how
much the probabilities of a given event, and the order of probabilities of
multiple events, can vary (dependent on the choice of ultrafilter).46
To put it differently,47 there may be multiple, equally good ways to model the
same situation, corresponding to different choices of the ultrafilter. What mat-
ters is what is true (or false) on all ways ofmaking these arbitrary choices—what
is supertrue (or superfalse)—as well as the spread of possible assignments. We
need not project these arbitrary choices onto what is being modelled.
In the context of decision theory, a family of NAP functions leads to more
subtle decisions. Let us consider a fair lottery on the natural numbers (starting
at one) and suppose you are given a choice between betting on the occurrence
of the set of even numbers and of the set of odd numbers. If you make
decisions based on real-valued probabilities, you are indifferent between
these two options. Since the choice concerns disjoint events, taking into
account the subset relation on the event space (as Easwaran [2014] suggests)
does not change this, either. By considering the family of NAP functions,
however, you may reasonably favour the set of odd numbers: some NAP
functions assign a higher probability to this set than to the even numbers,
whereas the others assign equal probabilities to both events.48 For some other
subsets of the sample space, you do not have any information based on real-
valued probability assignments. By considering the family of NAP functions,
it turns out that some events that are non-measurable on the classical account
have probabilities that vary between zero plus an infinitesimal and unity minus
45 But recall from the previous subsection that the classical approach may also be subject to this
criticism: it adds structure by declaring which sets are measurable and which are not.
46 This is familiar from the context of real-valued probabilities, where a family of probability
functions is used to represent imprecise probabilities; see, for example, (Walley [2000];
Halpern [2003]).
47 We are grateful to Alan Ha´jek for this suggestion.
48 See also Halpern’s ([2010], p. 167) example in which infinitesimal probabilities lead to decisions
that cannot be captured by Popper functions.
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an infinitesimal; but others vary within a smaller interval, for instance,
between one-third and two-thirds (plus minus an infinitesimal) (see Kremer
[2014]; Kerkvliet and Meester [2016]). Given the choice between such a subset
of N, S, and the set N mod 4, you do not need to know the exact hyperreal-
valued probability of the former to know that it has a higher probability of
winning than the latter (see also Wenmackers [unpublished]).
At the same time, a family of NAP functions is more definite since it spe-
cifies the relevant limit process. The Borel–Kolmogorov paradox (mentioned
in Footnote 7) demonstrates that classical probability functions alone do not
contain enough information to define all conditional probabilities; informa-
tion on the limiting process has to be supplemented. In the context of NAP,
specifying the limit process is reflected in a reduction of the family of free
ultrafilters and the corresponding family of NAP functions.
6.1.3 Domain and co-domain
NAP functions in the same family do not even have the same domain and co-
domain. Believers in objective probability hold that there is one ultimate
universal sample space. But NAP does not want to be restricted to sub-
domains of this sample space (if it exists at all). We also want to model
situations that are outside the physical realm. It may (or may not) be the
case, for instance, that the universal physical sample space is of the size of
the continuum. Then we would still want NAP to be able to model lotteries on
the function spaces on the real numbers, for instance.
Easwaran has objected to hyperreal credences using a complexity argument
([2014], Section 5.4). His conclusion, that physical agents cannot have hyperreal
credences, relies on four premises, two of which ‘might be controversial’ ([2014],
p. 29): ‘Credences supervene on the physical’ and ‘All physical quantities can be
entirely parametrized using the standard real numbers’. Bascelli et al. ([2014], p.
850) reject the second controversial premise, by referring to physical models that
do employ hyperreal numbers. We want probability theory to be applicable to
thought experiments, as well as to models in physics. Hence, we argue that a
probability theory should not depend on current physical theories, nor on con-
siderations about credences of actual agents (informed by such theories).
In classical probability theory, the interval ½0; 1 
 R serves as the value
range of all probability functions, even those that have R as its sample
space. The situation is different for non-standard probability theory. The
co-domain, R, of an NAP function, P, depends, inter alia, on its domain,
P ð Þ.
Ha´jek ([unpublished]) remarks that a probability theory that allows for reg-
ularity will have to look very different fromKolmogorov’s theory. By examining
NAP as an example of such a theory, we can make this claim more precise. A
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cardinality argument easily shows that regularity cannot be ensured for arbitrary
sample spaces if the range of the function is fixed (cf. Footnote 12). One crucial
difference between NAP and Kolmogorov’s theory is precisely that NAP con-
structs the range based on the sample space. However, this difference need not be
a problematic one. On the assumption that there is a strongly inaccessible car-
dinal, it can easily be shown that there are regular NAP probability functions
that are defined on all sets according to certain models of Zermelo–Fraenkel set
theory (with the axiom of choice).
6.2 Invariance
Now we return to the observation that the desideratum of regularity is in
tension with that of invariance. The arguments by Williamson, Parker, and
Barrett do show that NAP is incompatible with certain constraints on prob-
abilities that have some intuitive pull. One-to-one correspondence is a cele-
brated criterion of identity for cardinal number of sets: this is the Humean
principle (Section 3.6). But one-to-one correspondence is not the correct cri-
terion of identity for an ordinal number of a well-ordering: for finite sets, one-
to-one correspondence works fine; for infinite sets, it does not. So the criterion
of identity in terms of one-to-one correspondence is a symmetry principle that
holds for one concept (cardinal number) and not for another (ordinal
number). Does it hold for the probability of a set in a uniform distribution
context? As we have argued in Section 3.6, for finite sets it does, but for infinite
sets it does not; otherwise, we would be forced in any countably infinite sample
space to give all infinite sets a measure of one. This is something we do not
want, for the concept of a sparse infinite sets lies within the scope of our pre-
theoretical concept of probability. We have seen that we also have to give
up certain other invariance principles, such as translation-invariance
(Williamson’s coin tosses) and rotation-invariance (Barrett and Parker).
This again becomes clear only when one considers infinite sample spaces: if
we want a maximally fine-grained concept of probability, then we are forced to
accept the Euclidean principle. And this principle imposes limits on the
amount of invariance that a fine-grained probability function can support
(Benci et al. [2013], Section 5.4).
It is likely that Williamson intends his argument to be given a physical
interpretation. We know, one might say, that the laws of physics are time-
translation invariant. But Williamson’s argument purports to show that the-
ories assigning infinitesimal probabilities to particular infinite sequences of
fair coin tosses are not time-translation invariant. So, there is something
wrong with modelling infinite sequences of coin tosses in this way.
Williamson’s infinite series of fair coin tosses probably already transports us
out of the physical world. The scenario as described by Williamson is
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presumably inconsistent with our best current scientific theories. But ignoring
that, it is still not easy to see why the NAP treatment of Williamson’s scenario
has to violate time-translation invariance. We have to keep track of the sample
space in which we are working. In the time-translated scenario, there just is a
new sample space (containing one point event less than the original scenario).
For some purposes, we may want certain invariance properties even when
dealing with a fine-grained concept of probability. For instance, when considering
uniform distributions over the rational numbers, we may want the probability of
an interval to be proportional to the length of the interval. To a large extent, such
intuitions can be accommodated (Benci et al. [2013], Sections 5.3 and 5.4).
For other purposes, invariance behaviour (and simplicity) is more important
than fine-grainedness. In all such situations, classical probability suffices. Still, as
we have argued, there are kinds of probabilistic situations that cannot be mod-
elled by classical probability but that can be modelled well by NAP theory.
We end by concluding that there is a legitimate place for non-Archimedean
theories of probability. In the philosophical literature, infinitesimal probabilities
have received much criticism, but most of it does not hold up to scrutiny. We
have looked into NAP as a particular theory that contains infinitesimal prob-
abilities. Although this theory has some counterintuitive consequences, it also
has advantages over classical probability theory: it exhibits regularity, totality,
perfect additivity, and weak Laplacianism. On balance, we find NAP to be a
serious contender for a theory of probability, which we expect to be fruitful in
shedding new light on old puzzles that combine probability and infinity.
Appendix: ,, the :-limit
Let  be the family of the finite subsets of  ð ¼ Pfin ð ÞÞ49 and consider the
class of real-valued functions, F ;Rð Þ, defined on : Notice that if we fix
A 2 P ð Þ; we have that, for l 2 ; the conditional probability
PðAjl Þ 2 F ;Rð Þ. Thus, in order to formulate CPP for NAP, we are led to
the following axiomatic definition of ‘-limit’50:
Axiom 1 (Existence Axiom)
Every function ’ 2 F ;Rð Þ has a unique ‘-limit’ in a superreal field R  R,
which will be denoted by
49 In general,  is a directed set  Pfin ð Þ. As explained in (Benci et al. [2013]), some properties of
the resulting probability functions depend on the choice of . However, in order to understand
the construction of the limit, it is easiest to think of  as Pfin ð Þ.
50 An anonymous referee suggested that it is more intuitive to require the following: if ’  c
eventually, then lim l" ’ðlÞ  c. Please observe that this follows from the axioms.
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lim
l"
’ðlÞ:
Axiom 2 (Real Numbers Axiom)
Let ’ 2 F ;Rð Þ be eventually equal to c 2 R, namely, assume that
9l0 2 ; 8l  l0; ’ðlÞ ¼ c. Then:
lim
l"
’ðlÞ ¼ c:
Axiom 3 (Sum and Product Axiom)
If ’; 2 F ;Rð Þ; then
lim
l"
’ðlÞ þ  ðlÞð Þ ¼ lim
l"
’ðlÞ þ lim
l"
 ðlÞ;
lim
l"
’ðlÞ   ðlÞð Þ ¼ lim
l"
’ðlÞ  lim
l"
 ðlÞ:
First of all, we want to show that these axioms are consistent, so we will build a
model. If  is finite, the above axioms are trivially satisfied taking R ¼ R and
defining
lim
l"
’ðlÞ ¼ ’ðÞ:
If  is infinite, we take a fine and free ultrafilter, U; over , and we set51,52
R ¼ F ;Rð Þ=U: ðA:1Þ
The -limit is defined by
lim
l"
’ðlÞ ¼ ’½ U : ðA:2Þ
This model then has the required properties, with the fineness of the ultrafilter
guaranteeing regularity.
It is also possible to show that all the models of -limit have this form.
More precisely, assume that we have a structure ðR; lim l"Þ, where R is a
superreal field and
lim
l"
F ;Rð Þ!R
is an operator that satisfies axioms (1), (2), and (3). Then there is an ultrafilter
such that Equations (A.1) and (A.2) hold. We refer to (Benci et al. [2013]) for
further details on the -limit.
51 F ;Rð Þ=U denotes the set of equivalence classes ’½ Uwith respect to the relation&U , defined
by
’&U , 9Q 2 U; 8l 2 Q; ’ðlÞ ¼  ðlÞ:
52 Since we want to identify R with a subset ofR; the equivalence class of a function ’c identically
equal to c must be identified with the real number c.
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By Equation (A.1), it follows that R is a non-standard model of the real
numbers. For this reason, we refer to R as a field of hyperreal numbers. The
relation of NAPwithNSA is quite deep, particularly from the technical point of
view and we refer to (Benci et al. [2013]) for a discussion of this point as well.
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